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STATEMENT OF ISSUE
Did the District Court err in granting Summary Judgment awarding plaintiffs a real estate commission on the sale
of a commercial property which was the subject of a written exclusive listing agreement.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
In this action, plaintiffs seek an award of a real
estate sales commission pursuant to a written exclusive listing
agreement for the sale of a commercial building owned by the
defendants.
B.

Course of Proceedings
On August 30, 1985, cross-motions for summary judgment

were argued before the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable David B. Dee, presiding.
C.

Disposition in the Court Below
On October 8, 1985, the District Court granted summary

judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants
entitling plaintiffs to a real estate commission pursuant to
the exclusive listing agreement.
- 2 -

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Gump & Ayers Real Estate, Inc. is a Utah corpora-

tion and Victor R. Ayers, a licensed real estate broker, is the
designated broker for Gump & Ayers (collectively "Gump & Ayers").
R. 3 para. 1-2.
2.

Defendant Domcoy Investors V is a California limited

partnership ("Domcoy").
3.

R. 153, p. 25.

Defendant Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., a Utah corpo-

ration (the "Domcoy Corporation") is the sole general partner
of Domcoy.

R. 153, p. 12.
4.

The Domcoy Corporation is owned by the following

individuals in the following percentages:

Mr. and Mrs. Eugene

E. Doms (50%) and Mr. and Mrs. Michael R. McCoy (50%).

Mr. McCoy

("McCoy") and Mr. Doms ("Doms") are officers and directors of
Domcoy Corporation with McCoy serving as President.

McCoy is a

practicing attorney, and was admitted to the California Bar in
1975.

R. 153, p. 12.
5.

Domcoy was formed in late 1982 for the purpose of

acquiring real property in Salt Lake City, Utah, specifically
the Sterling-Greenwald Building, located at 35 West Broadway
("Property").

The Property is classified as a historic structure.

Such a classification bestows unique tax advantages to investors/
owners.

R. 153, p. 25.
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6.

Domcoy purchased the Property in December, 1982.

R. 153, p. 29.
7.

Doms, representing Domcoy, interviewed numerous

brokers in an attempt to list the Property.

In the spring of

1984, at Gump & Ayers main office in Salt Lake City, Doms interviewed Ronald W. Christensen ("Christensen"), the manager of
the Commercial Division of Gump & Ayers.
8.

R. 152, p. 11.

During the initial meeting between Christensen

and Doms, Doms requested, and later received, from Gump & Ayers
a marketing proposal for the Property.
9.

R. 152, p. 15.

Copies of the marketing proposal were sent to Doms

and McCoy, after which Doms told Christensen that McCoy would
contact Gump & Ayers concerning the marketing of the Property.
R. 152, p. 15.
10.

In July of 1984, Christensen and McCoy met.

McCoy

told Christensen that Domcoy's plans for marketing the Property,
that is, whether to lease or sell office condominiums, and the
price for such, were yet to be determined.

McCoy also told Chris-

tensen that Domcoy's plans were still in flux because it was
studying the procedure for historic rehabilitation certification
and the tax credits available.

This was information that poten-

tial tenants would find material.

- 4 -

11.

During a subsequent meeting between McCoy and

Christensen, a discussion was had concerning the general marketing
of the Property, the present inability to establish an exact
price for sale or lease of the Property and the fact that McCoy
would personally handle the marketing of the Property while Doms
would be responsible for the construction/rehabilitation of the
Property.

R. 152, p. 32.
12.

During the aforementioned meeting, or at a subse-

quent meeting, between Christensen and McCoy, a Sales Agency
Contract between Gump & Ayers and Domcoy was discussed ("Listing
Agreement").

Appendix I.

In discussing the Listing Agreement,

Christensen told McCoy that the document was broad enough to
entitle Gump & Ayers to a commission whether the Property was
leased, sold or exchanged and, in addition, that once the Listing
Agreement was signed, Gump & Ayers could market and put a sign
on the Property.

Christensen also told McCoy that Domcoy would

have the ultimate decision on whether the Property was sold or
leased as well as the ultimate purchase price for the Property.
Christensen would not have marketed or placed a sign on the property without such a signed Listing Agreement.
13.

R. 152, pp. 32-35.

After Christensen explained the Listing Agreement

to McCoy, McCoy read it and signed it.
152, p. 36.
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R. 153, p. 33, 44; P.

14.

McCoy signed the Listing Agreement in his capacity

as President of the Domcoy Corporation and as General Partner
of Domcoy.

R. 153, p. 33.

15.

In addition to being a lawyer, McCoy had substantial

experience in the real estate development having bought and sold
approximately 17 properties over the 5 year period preceding
the Listing Agreement.
16.

R. 153, pp. 6-24.

Prior to the execution of the exclusive listing

agreement with Gump & Ayers, Domcoy had signed several single
party or non-exclusive listing agreements with other brokers.
These non-exclusive agreements had not resulted in a sale or
lease of the building.
17.

During the meeting at which McCoy signed the Listing

Agreement, Christensen explained to him that an "Available" sign
posted on the Property would denote that the Property was available for sale, lease or exchange.

McCoy had no objection to

having this particular type of sign placed on the Property.
R. 152, p. 40.
18.

On August 29, 1984, after the Listing Agreement

was signed by McCoy, Gump & Ayers put an "Available" sign on
the Property and actively began its efforts to market the Property.

R. 152, p. 24.
19.

After the Listing Agreement was signed by McCoy

and Gump & Ayers's sign was placed on the Property, McCoy and
- 6 -

Christensen spoke often by telephone concerning the progress of
the construction on the property and any inquiries received by
Gump & Ayers from potential buyers or tenants.

McCoy was respon-

sive to the marketing needs of Gump & Ayers and the information
needs of prospective tenants.
20.

R. 152, p. 48.

During the month of December 1984, the communication

channels between Christensen and McCoy broke down.

Christensen

had arranged two meetings with McCoy at Gump & Ayers main Salt
Lake City Office.

These meetings were intended to show the Prop-

erty to prospective purchasers and/or tenants.

McCoy agreed to

such meetings on two separate occasions but failed to attend
the meetings without any advance notice to Christensen.

R. 152,

pp. 49-52.
21.

After McCoy failed to meet with Christensen, Chris-

tensen called Domcoy's counsel to find out why the appointments
were missed.

Christensen was informed by Domcoy's counsel that

he did not know.

In addition, after McCoy missed the appointments

he also failed to return any of Christensen's telephone calls.
Approximately two weeks after the appointments were missed,
Domcoy's counsel told Christensen that the Property had been
sold and, in addition, he apologized for the "break-down in communication".
22.

R. 152, p. 53.
The Property was sold by Domcoy to an entity known

as Garfield Residential Ltd. Partneship #611, a Connecticut
- 7 -

limited partnership ("Garfield") on December 31, 1984. R. 153
p. 34
23.

At no time, either before or after the Property's

sale to Garfield, did a representative of Domcoy inform Gump &
Ayers that the Listing Agreement had been terminated.

R. 153

pp. 56, 57.
24.

The Property was initially sold for $5,857,000.00.

R. 153. p. 36.

However, the Sales Agreement was later amended

and the sales price was reduced to $4,900,000.00. R 130, Para. 1.
25.

According to the express terms of the Listing Agree-

ment, a six-percent (6%) commission was payable to Gump & Ayers
if, during the term of the Listing Agreement, the Property was
sold, leased or exchanged by the owner, or any other party.

R.

48, Para. 2.
26.

The Listing Agreement also provided that such a

commission would be due and payable upon the closing of the sale
or exchange, unless otherwise agreed in writing.

The parties

did not agree in writing to have the commission paid at any other
time.

R. 48 Para. 2.
27.

Gump & Ayers made repeated demands upon Domcoy

for a commission of 6-percent (6%) of the price paid by Garfield
for the Property; however, Domcoy refused to pay the commission.
R. 39 Para. 30.
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28.

On or about February 8, 1985, this action was filed

by Gump & Ayers seeking its commission from Domcoy.
29.

R. 2

After discovery, cross-motions for Summary Judgment

were filed by Gump & Ayers and Domcoy.

These motions were argued

on August 30, 1985, before the Third Judicial District Court,
the Honorable David B. Dee, presiding.
30.

On October 8, 1985, the Trial Court granted Summary

Judgment in favor of Gump & Ayers.
31.

R. 101.

This appeal followed.

R. 108.
R. 123.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Gump & Ayers and Domcoy voluntarily and at arm's length
entered into an exclusive listing agreement for the sale of the
historic Sterling-Greenwald Building.

In reliance on the Listing

Agreement, Gump & Ayers spent time and money in its efforts to
market the Property.

After the Property was sold, Domcoy sought

to avoid payment of the commisson.

It did not seek to cancel or

reform the agreement based upon fraud, misrepresentation or mutual
mistake of fact—for these claims were not and in good faith could
not be raised.

Rather, it sought to avoid its contractual obli-

gations because the Listing Agreement was not "sufficiently definite" to be enforced.

Despite the fact that cross-motions for

summary judgment were filed, Domcoy now argues that extrinsic
facts are necessary to interpret the Listing Agreement.
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ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE
GUMP & AYERS ON THE LISTING AGREEMENT.
A.

Introduction
In essence, Domcoy argues that the District Court erred

in granting Summary Judgment in favor of Gump & Ayers on the Listing Agreement because there are disputed issues of material fact
concerning the intent of the parties to the Listing Agreement.
Specifically, the Domcoy contends:
(1)

That its intent in signing the Listing Agreement

was merely as an "accommodation" to allow Gump & Ayers to
place an "Available" sign on the Property;
(2)

That there was no meeting of the minds concerning

a commission; and
(3)

That the Listing Agreement is too vague to be en-

forceable since no listed price or term was included.
Based upon these alleged infirmities, Domcoy contends
that the intent of the parties to the Listing Agreement could not
be ascertained from the Listing Agreement standing alone and,
therefore, extrinsic evidence should have been received by the
District Court to arrive at the parties 1 intent.
below, this contention is erroneous.
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As will be shown

The Listing Agreement is exclusive.

It is well-estab-

lished that a broker earns a real estate commission pursuant to
an exclusive listing agreement when the subject property is sold
during the term of such agreement.

This Court has enforced ex-

clusive listing agreements because of their necessity in the real
estate industry.
(1963).

Chumney v. Stott, 14 Utah 2d 202, 381 P.2d 84

In the Chumney decision, it was stated:
Moreover, the type of "exclusive right to
sell" real estate listings involved in this
action has been universally upheld. The nature
of the real estate business, wherein the broker
is paid only if a sale is made, would seem
to make the contract provision here in question
a reasonable one.

14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86.

The property in Chumney was sold

to a buyer who had not dealt in any way with the broker; rather,
the sale was made by the owner without the broker's knowledge.
Yet, it was held that the broker was entitled to a commission.
The reasoning of Chumney is applicable to the facts of
this case.
ment.

The parties entered into an exclusive Listing Agree-

Based upon the Agreement, Gump & Ayers invested its time

and money in the marketing of the Property.

It would not have

marketed the Property without knowing it would be compensated
for its efforts when the property was sold.

Domcoy accepted the

full benefit of Gump & Ayers's services and encouraged Gump &
Ayers in its marketing efforts.

The Property was sold before

- 11 -

the Listing Agreement was terminated; therefore, a commission
was earned by Gump & Ayers.
B.

The Listing Agreement is not Ambiguous
As this Court stated in its decision in the case of

Oberhansly v. Earle,
It is a basic principle of contract law that
there can be no contract without a meeting
of the minds of the parties which must be
spelled out either expressly or impliedly
with sufficient definiteness to allow enforcement . . . Of course the intentions of the
parties are controlling and normally those
intentions can be found from the instrument
itself. If a writing is not sufficient to
establish meaning, however, resort may be
had to extraneous evidence manifesting the
intentions of the parties.
572 P.2d 1384 at 1386 (Utah 1975).

See also Bennett v. Robin-

son's Medical Mart, Inc., 18 Utah 2d, 186, 417 P.2d 761 (1966).
As discussed in the Oberhansly decision, a court's first
and foremost task in determining the intent of the parties to a
written agreement is to determine whether the agreement is ambiguous.

This determination is a question of law to be decided by

the court, Morris v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company, 658 P.2d 1199 (Utah 1983); Hippon v. Truck Insurance
Exchange, 657 P.2d 1358 (Utah 1983); Winegar v. Smith Investment
Co., 590 P.2d 348 (Utah 1979), and any ambiguity must be apparent
on the face of the written agreement; merely because the parties
disagree as to its meaning does not render an agreement ambig-
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uous.

In re the Marriage of Anderson, 711 P.2d 699 (Colo. App.

1985).
A contract is ambiguous when the meaning or application
of words in the contract are doubtful or uncertain.
Smith Investment Co., supra.

Winecrar v.

A review of the Listing Agreement

reveals no such ambiguity.1
The Listing Agreement was read and signed by McCoy, an
attorney and experienced developer, in his capacities as President
of the Domcoy Corporation and as a General Partner of the Domcoy
Partnership.

R. 153, p. 44. McCoy had the burden not only to

read, but also to understand, the Listing Agreement before he

1

The Listing Agreement provides, in relevant part:

In consideration of [Gump & Ayers] agreement to
list the property . . . and to use reasonable efforts
to find a purchaser or tenant therefore, [Domcoy Investors V and Domcoy Enterprises, Inc.] hereby grant[s]
you for the period stated herein, from date hereof,
the exclusive right to sell,- lease, or exchange said
property or any part thereof, at the price and terms
stated herein, or at such other price or terms to which
I may agree in writing.
During the life of this contract, if you find a
party who is ready, willing and able to buy, lease or
exchange said property or any part thereof, at said
price and terms, or any other price or terms, to which
I may agree in writing, or if said property or any part
thereof is sold, leased or exchanged during said term
by myself or any other party, I agree to pay [Gump &
Ayers] a commission of 6% of such sale, lease or exchange
price which commission unless otherwise agreed in writing
shall be due and payable on the date of closing of the
sale, lease or exchange.
- 13 -

signed it.

Resource Management Company v. Western Ranch and Live-

stock Company, Inc., 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985).
In the Listing Agreement, Domcoy agreed that a commission
would be paid to Gump & Ayers if, and when, any one of the
following conditions precedent ocurred during its term ("Conditions") :
(1)

Gump & Ayers produced a party who was ready, wil-

ling and able to buy the property at the listed price;
(2)

Gump & Ayers produced a party who agreed to buy

the Property at a price agreed to in writing by defendants;
or
(3)

the Property was sold by Domcoy or any other party,

at any price.
The Property was sold to a party who, concededly, was
not produced by Gump & Ayers; nevertheless, Gump & Ayers is entitled to a commission since the Listing Agreement expressly provides for a commission in such event.

Despite that provision,

Domcoy argues that because a Listed Price and the term were omitted
from the Listing Agreement, it is ambiguous and summary judgment
was inappropriate.

As will be demonstrated below, these omissions

were not essential to enforcement of the Listing Agreement, nor
do they render the Listing Agreement ambiguous.
1.

The Omitted Listed Price does not Render the Listing

Agreement Ambiguous.

Domcoy contends that the omission of a Listed
- 14 -

Price from the Listing Agreement .renders it ambiguous and, therefore, summary judgment was inappropriate.
incorrect.

This contention is

The omission from the Listing Agreement of a Listed

Price merely negated one of the Conditions precedent set forth
in the Listing Agreement upon which a commission would be earned.
In fact, the omission of a Listed Price inured to the benefit of
Domcoy.

By omitting a Listed Price, Gump & Ayers was deprived

of the Listing Agreement's protection in the event they produced
a "ready, willing and able" buyer but, for some reason, Domcoy
refused to sell.

Since there is no Listed Price against which a

court could gauge the readiness, ability or willingness of a proposed buyer, the Property would have to be sold before a commission
was earned.
A Listed Price is wholly inapplicable to sales embraced
by the second or third Conditions set forth above.

It follows

that although the Property was sold to a party who was not produced
by Gump & Ayers, a commission was earned since the Listing Agreement unambiguously provides for a commission in such an event.
2.

The Omission of the Term does not Render the Listing

Agreement Ambiguous.

With respect to the Listing Agreement's

omission of its term, courts have overwhelmingly held that agency
relationships, which by definition are consensual, are terminable
at will by either the principal or the agent, which power of termination is not affected by either an express or impled contract
- 15 -

between the parties that the agency is irrevocable.

See e.g.

McDonald Company v. Fishtail Creek Ranch Ltd. Partnership, 572
P.2d 195 (Mont. 1977), Peterson v. Peterson, 700 P.2d 585 (Kan.
App. 1985); Ireland v. Wvnkop, 539 P.2d 1349 (Colo. App. 1975).
Granted, either the principal or the agent may sue the other for
breach of the agency agreement based upon termination contrary
to the agreement, but the agency relationship itself is terminable
at will.
The foregoing principle was specifically applied to a
real estate listing agreement without a definite period of duration in Jaudon v. Slink, 276 S.E. 2d 507 (N.C. App. 1981).

In

that case, the court held the listing agreement to be revocable
at will by either party.

Similarly, this Court applied the prin-

ciple to an employment contract in its decision in the case of
Bullocks v. Desert Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 354
P.2d 559 (1960).

In Bullocks, it was held that:

Absent other controlling facts, it is generally recognized that under such a provision
[a general statement in the employment contract that defendant agreed to employ plaintiff without any mention of term of employment] either party may terminate the employment at will.
11 Utah 2d at 4; 354 P.2d at 562. Thus, in this case, the parties1
omission of the term of the Listing Agreement is not fatal to its
enforcement, rather, such omission merely allowed Domcoy to terminate the Listing Agreement at any time.
- 16 -

Domcoy admits that it did not terminate or revoke the
Listing Agreement before the sale of the Property.

In his depo-

sition, McCoy stated:
Q.

At any time since July 1, of 1984, have you ever

informed Ron Christensen that Gump & Ayers was not to proceed
with the marketing of the Sterling Greenwald Building?
A.

No.

Q.

To your knowledge has anyone representing Domcoy

told Ron Christensen of Gump & Ayers that he was not to proceed with the marketing of the Sterling Greenwald building?
A.

No.

Q.

Has anyone told Ron Christensen of Gump & Ayers

that he was not to proceed with the marketing of the Sterling
Greenwald Building?
A.

No.

R. 153, p.55, 56.
Under such facts, and according to agency law, the District Court properly granted summary judgment entitling Gump &
Ayers to its commission.

The Listing Agreement is not ambiguous

and expressly states that Gump & Ayers was entitled to a commission notwithstanding the fact that the property was sold to a
party procured by the seller or some person rather than Gump &
Ayers.

- 17 -

C

Any Ambiguities in the Listing Agreement were Properly Resolved

by the District Court as a Matter of Law,
Even if this Court finds that the Listing Agreement
was ambiguous because of the omission of its term or a Listed
Price, the resolution of such ambiguities was a question of law
for the District Court to resolve.

Overson v, United States Fi-

delity & Guaranty Co., 587 P.2d 149 (Utah 1978); Petty v. Gindy
Manufacturing Corp., 17 Utah 2d 332 404 P.2d 30 (1965).

Before

the District Court, Domcoy did not traverse the facts that McCoy
signed the Listing Agreement in July of 1984, and that the Listing
Agreement was never revoked.

Such being the case, the District

Court properly resolved any ambiguity as to when the Listing Agreement became effective by concluding, as a matter of law, that it
became effective in July of 1984.

In addition, any ambiguity as

to the duration of the Listing Agreement was properly resolved
by reference to the general agency principle that an agency relationship is revocable at will by either the principal or the agent,
as discussed above, and that no such revocation occurred in this
case.
Finally, perhaps the most important fact concerning
the intent of the parties to the Listing Agreement is McCoy's
candid admission in his deposition that if Gump & Ayers produced
a buyer who bought either the entire building, or a portion thereof, after the Listing Agreement was signed, the six-percent (6%)
- 18 -

commission set forth in the Listing Agreement would have been
paid.

R. 153; pp. 39-40.

This acknowledgement underscores the

unambiguous intent of the parties to the Listing Agreement, and
illuminates Domcoy's desire to treat the Listing Agreement as a
legal buffet from which they can discriminately select the favorable provisions, such as Gump & Ayers marketing of the Property,
while ignoring the distasteful provisions, such as their duty to
pay a commission.
wise.

The Utah decisions on the subject hold other-

Sellers may not take advantage of the services of a broker

and, subsequently, disregard their liability to pay a commission
based upon a non-essential infirmity in the Listing Agreement.
In Morris v. John Price Associates, Inc., 590 P.2d 315
(Utah 1979), the broker sought a commission arising from the lease
of office space.

The writing supporting the claimed commission

was a letter written by the defendant to the plaintiff that merely
stated the following:

"This letter is to assure you that we will

cover you on a six percent commission is a successful lease is
negotiated with IBM on the second building on Meridian Park Office
Building".

This Court held that the letter was sufficient to

entitle the broker to his commission despite the fact that the
lease price, the duration of the agency and even the signature
of the broker were omitted from the agreement.
Another Utah decision concerning the payment of a real
estate commission is Taylor National, Inc. v. Jensen Brothers
- 19 -

Construction Company, 641 P.2d 150 (Utah 1982).

In that case,

the listing agreement was signed only by the owner and provided
that the agent would be entitled to a six-percent commission on
the sale of a house.

This Court acknowledged that the agreement

was undated and that the duration that the agreement was to remain
in effect was omitted.

Nevertheless, it was held that the listing

agreement was enforceable and the payment of a commission was
ordered.

It was noted in the Taylor National decision that the

actions of the parties showed that they intended to be bound by
the Listing Agreement.
Similarly, in the present case, the actions of the parties indicated that they intended to be bound by the terms of
the Listing Agreement.

Gump & Ayers posted a sign on the Property

and actively pursued steps in the marketing of the Property.
Gump & Ayers referred interested parties to Domcoy and McCoy admitted in his deposition that if a buyer or tenant had been found
by Gump & Ayers, a six-percent commission would have been paid
to Gump & Ayers.
To summarize, the Listing Agreement was not ambiguous
and did not lack any essential terms.

McCoy, an attorney, read

and presumably understood the Listing Agreement before he signed
it.

Although the Property was sold to a buyer produced by someone

other than Gump & Ayers, a commission was due and payable to Gump
& Ayers pursuant to the express provisions of the Listing Agree- 20 -

ment.

Domcoy's attempts to argue otherwise should be viewed in

light of this Court's advisory statement in the case of Kier v,
Condrac, 25 Utah 2d 139, 478 P.2d 327, 330 (1970):
We recognize the validity of the rules relied
upon by the defendants said to be enforceable
a contract must be sufficiently definite in
its terms that the party know what is required
of them. But like all rules, which are necessarily stated in generality, it is only applicable in the proper circumstances, where the
justice of the case requires as a shield to
protect the party from injustice and not as
a weapon with which to perpetrate injustice.
Gump & Ayers submits that an injustice would be perpetrated should
Domcoy be allowed to escape the consequences of the Listing
Agreement in which they agreed to pay a real estate commission.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the arguments set forth above, and the cases
cited therein, this Court should affirm the District Court's Order
granting summary judgment to Gump & Ayers on the grounds and for
the reasons that the Listing Agreement is not ambiguous and Gump
& Ayers is, therefore, entitled to a real estate commission as a
matter of law.
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